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DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF YOU DON’T: THE
EXPANSION OF TORT LIABILITY TO AIRPORT
OWNERS AND OPERATORS WHO REGULATE
AIRLINE AND VENDOR OPERATIONS
CARYN GERAGHTY JORGENSEN*
HUNTER G. JEFFERS**
TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS recognizing a distinction be-tween employees and independent contractors provided a
degree of certainty and predictability when assessing potential
liability for injuries occurring at a multiple-employer workplace.
If a worker was injured on the worksite, workers’ compensation
systems provided benefits to cover medical expenses and lost
wages. In exchange for contributing to the workers’ compensa-
tion system, employers were immunized from tort liability to
their employees. Likewise, historically, a general contractor was
not liable for injuries sustained by the employee of an indepen-
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dent contractor unless that general contractor’s active negli-
gence contributed to cause the injury. This doctrine is
commonly referred to as the “independent contractor doc-
trine.” The concept of “retained control” has eroded the inde-
pendent contractor doctrine—exposing general contractors at
multiple-employer worksites to liability for injuries to the em-
ployees of independent contractors.
Courts have expanded the retained control exception beyond
the field of construction site accidents and applied it to assess
liability of airport owners and operators for injuries to employ-
ees of airport lessees and licensed vendors. Liability based on
control has particular significance in the context of airports, be-
cause federal law mandates that airport operators exercise a
great deal of control over terminals, airfields, and runways. Air-
ports must establish, implement, and train all persons with ac-
cess to secured areas, runways, and taxiways regarding
movement and operation in those areas. Under the retained
control exception, airport owners potentially are exposed to tort
liability merely by exercising control mandated by federal law.
Courts should account for this federally mandated control when
analyzing the policies behind this theory of liability.
The risk of exposure to airport owners and operators is miti-
gated through broadly written indemnity provisions in vendor
license agreements and airport leases. The result of these in-
demnity provisions, however, is that workers’ compensation im-
munity effectively is destroyed. The legally immune employer
and its liability policy respond to the injured employee’s tort
claim, thus reducing (if not eliminating) the industry cost-sav-
ings of the workers’ compensation system. This result was
neither intended by the workers’ compensation system nor, ap-
parently, anticipated by the gradual but persistent erosion of the
independent contractor doctrine.
Legislation expressly preempting state law retained control
principles could reinstate the predictability and certainty of the
workers’ compensation system in the context of Part 139 airport
operations. Airport owners and operators would remain liable
under premises liability theories or if their own employees’ neg-
ligence caused injury, but they would be protected from suit by
employees of vendors and lessees who are injured by lapses in
their own employer’s safety programs. Such a system would
place responsibility for worksite injuries in the hands of those
responsible for and in the best position to ameliorate the risk—
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the employers of the injured employees—as our workers’ com-
pensation system originally contemplated.
I. THE INTERPLAY AMONG WORKERS’ COMPENSATION,
THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DOCTRINE,
AND THE RETAINED CONTROL
EXCEPTION IN RECOVERY FOR
WORK-RELATED INJURIES
Workers’ compensation provides compensation for injury, dis-
ability, or death resulting from work-related accidents. It is fun-
damentally distinct from tort liability in that it provides benefits
regardless of fault.1 Injured workers need only prove a nexus
between their injuries and their employment to receive cash
wage benefits and medical care.2 The “underlying premise” of
workers’ compensation “is that the costs of industrial accidents
. . . should, like other costs of doing business, be borne by the
enterprise that engendered them.”3 This policy is meant to moti-
vate employers to make workplaces safer,4 while providing work-
ers with “swift and certain compensation.”5 The quid pro quo
for swift and certain compensation is the relinquishment of rem-
edies available at common law.6 “As a general rule, an employee
injured in the course of employment is limited to the remedies
available under a state’s workers’ compensation act.”7 Exclusivity
prevents “double recovery” against an employer for “a workers’
compensation award and a tort judgment.”8
This was no “great sacrifice” at the time of enactment as most
workers were previously left uncompensated for workplace inju-
ries by the early 20th century common law system.9 But the num-
ber of covered workers and the effectiveness of legal remedies
have increased dramatically since that time. As of 2007, workers’
compensation systems covered ninety-four percent of the
United States’ wage and salary workers, and some form of work-
1 LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND TEXT § 1.04 (4th ed. 2008).
2 Id. § 1.03.
3 Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee’s Workers’ Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 406 (1988).
4 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 14 (2016).
5 Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers’ Compensation
Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (1983) [hereinafter Exceptions].
6 Id.
7 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 54 (2016).
8 Id. § 56.
9 Exceptions, supra note 5, at 1641.
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ers’ compensation legislation has been enacted in all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands.10 In addition, the present tort system has largely reduced
common law bars to recovery, developed new theories of recov-
ery for injured workers, and provided increased availability of
public assistance and legal representation.11 Employees are in-
creasingly “questioning the terms by which they ceded their
common law rights” and searching for ways to pierce the exclu-
sive remedy rule of workers’ compensation.12 Unlike when work-
ers’ compensation statutes were enacted, employees now can
pursue much bigger recoveries via tort remedies against third
parties.13
Generally, courts have been unwilling to erode workers’ com-
pensation immunity by judicial action and instead have awaited
legislative reform.14 But workers’ compensation only limits ac-
tions by employees against their direct employers.15 To the ex-
tent an injury is attributable to a third party, workers are “not
constrained by the exclusive remedy rule.”16 Workers are al-
lowed—and even encouraged—to pursue legal remedies against
parties with whom they have no employment relationship under
the theory that the industry should not bear the cost of an injury
for which it is not responsible.17 Because workers’ compensation
is awarded regardless of fault, workers may still accept benefits
from their employers prior to bringing suit against a third
party.18 Employers (or their workers’ compensation insurers, in-
cluding state-administered systems) are then entitled to subroga-
tion from successful plaintiffs to prevent double recovery.19
10 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOC. SEC. OFFICE OF POLICY, 67 SOC. SEC. BULL. NO. 1,
RECENT TRENDS IN WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (2007).
11 Exceptions, supra note 5, at 1645.
12 Id. at 1641; see King, supra note 3, at 408.
13 Donald T. DeCarlo & Martin Minkowitz, Workers’ Compensation and Employers’
Liability Law: National Developments and Trends, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 521, 522
(1990).
14 Exceptions, supra note 5, at 1641.
15 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 64 (2016).
16 Exceptions, supra note 5, at 1643 n.13.
17 See 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers’ Compensation § 86 (2016).
18 Exceptions, supra note 5, at 1643 n.13.
19 Id.
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A. TRADITIONALLY, ENTITIES HIRING AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR WERE NOT LIABLE IN TORT FOR INJURIES
TO EMPLOYEES OF THE INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR
The classification of an individual as either an employee or an
independent contractor is a hotbed of litigation.20 There is no
bright-line rule for determining whether an individual is an in-
dependent contractor or an employee.21 Many jurisdictions em-
ploy a multi-factor test that analyzes the “extent of control” the
employer “exercise[s] over the detail of the work,” whether the
employer provides the tools, instrumentalities, and place of
work, and whether the employed contractor “is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business.”22 The degree of control re-
tained by the independent contractor’s hirer has become the
most important factor in classifying the individual worker,23 and
it is at the heart of all legal definitions of independent con-
tactor.24 Workers’ compensation immunity has no application to
an independent contractor because a contractor is not an “em-
ployee” within the meaning of workers’ compensation.25 Inde-
pendent contractors are, therefore, allowed to pursue tort
remedies against their hirers.
An independent contractor may be free from the limits of
workers’ compensation, but the common law still limits the in-
dependent contractor’s ability to sue the overall employer, typi-
cally a job-site owner or general contractor. The general rule is
20 Fredric Leffler, Senior Counsel, Proskauer Rose LLP, Presentation at the
American Bar Association Labor and Employment Law Section Wage & Hour




21 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors §§ 5, 8–9 (2016).
22 Id. § 5.
23 Id. §§ 5, 8–9.
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (an inde-
pendent contractor is one “who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other’s right to control.”); Independent Contractor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014) (“[o]ne who is entrusted to undertake a specific project but who is left
free to do the assigned work and to choose the method for accomplishing it.”);
41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 1 (2016) (“one who, in exercising an in-
dependent employment, contracts to do certain work according to his or her own
methods, without being subject to the control of the employer, except as to the
product or result of the work.”).
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 cmt. d, § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1958); see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, at § 1.01.
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that an overall employer who hires an independent contractor is
not liable for harm caused by an “act or omission of the contrac-
tor.”26 The independent contractor controls the manner in
which the work is completed, so the contractor, rather than the
overall employer, is the “proper party” to be charged with
preventing and bearing the risk of harm.27 The injured worker
still receives workers’ compensation available from his direct
employer, the independent contractor. “[W]hen the person in-
jured by negligently performed contracted work is one of the
contractor’s own employees, the injury is already compensable
under the workers’ compensation scheme[,] and therefore the
[law] should provide no tort remedy, for those same injuries,
against the person who hired the independent contractor.”28 Al-
lowing suit against the overall employer “would illogically and
unfairly subject the hiring person, who did nothing to create the
risk that caused the injury, to greater liability than that faced by
the independent contractor whose negligence caused the em-
ployee’s injury” because the independent contractor, not the
hirer, would be shielded from tort liability.29 The independent
contractor doctrine protected against this illogical result by
shielding the overall employer from liability for the contractor’s
employees’ workplace injuries.
B. THE RETAINED CONTROL EXCEPTION CONTINUES TO ERODE
THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DOCTRINE, BECOMING,
IN SOME INSTANCES, THE “RULE” ITSELF
Unlike workers’ compensation immunity, a creature of statute
that judges have been reticent to erode by judicial action,30 the
common law independent contractor doctrine has been whit-
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see, e.g.,
Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721, 730 (Cal. 1993) (declining to apply Cali-
fornia’s peculiar risk doctrine to impose liability on property owner for injuries to
the negligent independent contractor’s own employees because such application
would conflict with California’s system of worker’s compensation).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see,
e.g., SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 258 P.3d 737, 738 (Cal. 2011) (“By
hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegates to the contractor
any tort law duty it owes to the contractor’s employees to ensure the safety of the
specific workplace that is the subject of the contract. That implicit delegation
includes any tort law duty the hirer owes to the contractor’s employees to comply
with applicable statutory or regulatory safety requirements.”).
28 Privette, 854 P.2d at 726.
29 Toland v. Sunland Housing Group, Inc., 955 P.2d 504, 506 (Cal. 1998).
30 Exceptions, supra note 5, at 1641.
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tled away, expanding third party liability for workplace injuries.
The independent contractor doctrine “is now primarily impor-
tant as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions.”31 The rule
generally applies only “where no good reason is found for de-
parting from it.”32
The retained control exception is perhaps the most often in-
voked exception under the independent contractor doctrine.
Most states applying the exception do so in reliance on the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 414: “One who entrusts work to
an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any
part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others
for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable
care . . . .”33 This exception seeks to place the risk of loss on the
party that controls, at some level sufficient under state common
law, the safety of the work and the jobsite.34 After all, it is the
delegation of control to the independent contractor that ab-
solves landowners and general contractors in the first place.35 If,
instead of delegating control, the landowner or general contrac-
tor continues to exercise control, then liability may attach.36
The retained control exception developed in the construction
industry to place responsibility on general contractors for over-
all project safety where projects often involve multiple indepen-
dent contractors. “We regard it to be part of the business of a
general contractor to assure that reasonable steps within its su-
pervisory and coordinating authority are taken to guard against
readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas
[that] create a high degree of risk . . . .”37 Landowners, on the
other hand, ordinarily are not liable.38 “In contrast with a gen-
eral contractor, the owner typically is not a professional builder.
Most owners visit the construction site only casually and are not
knowledgeable concerning safety measures.”39 A landowner may
be held liable only where the owner “exercised an unusually
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (quot-
ing Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 N.W. 226 (Minn. 1937)).
32 Id.
33 Id. § 414.
34 See id.
35 See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 27 (2016).
36 See, e.g., Funk v. Gen. Motors Corp., 220 N.W.2d 641, 645–49 (Mich. 1974).
37 Id. at 646.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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high degree of control over the construction project . . . .”40
Thus, courts should require substantial control before subject-
ing a landowner to liability under this exception.
It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the
work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations [that] need
not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and devia-
tions. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it
does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods
of work, or as to operative detail.”41
The Restatement provides that one who retains “control” is
liable to “others” for physical harm.42 But not all courts are will-
ing to accept that “others” refers to employees of independent
contractors. In King v. Shelby Rural Electric Cooperative Corp.,43 a
Kentucky case, the court noted:
Nothing in the discussions of Sections 413, 414, 416, and 427 of
the Restatement, Torts 2d[ ] indicates that an employee of an
independent contractor is within the class of “others” protected
by those sections. All of the illustrations set out in the Restate-
ment refer to liability of the employer of an independent con-
tractor to third parties other than employees of the independent
contractor.44
For liability to attach to an owner or general contractor under
the retained control exception, some courts require an addi-
tional finding that the negligent exercise of that control affirma-
tively contributed to the cause of injury.45 In Hooker v. Department
of Transportation, the California Supreme Court further elabo-
rated on its Privette-Toland line of cases, holding:
40 Id. at 647; see Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 320, 325–27
(Mich. 2004) (clarifying Funk and holding that under Michigan law, the retained
control exception is a subset of the “common work area doctrine” under which a
property owner could be liable for an independent contractor’s employee injury
if the “owner acts in a ‘superintending capacity and has knowledge of high de-
grees of risk faced by construction workers’”).
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
42 Id. § 414.
43 502 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1973).
44 Id. at 662 (discussing tentative draft language of comments under the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, Chapter 15, “when the Sections in this Chapter
speak of liability to ‘another’ or ‘others,’ or to ‘third persons,’ it is to be under-
stood that the employees of the contractor, as well as those of the defendant
himself, are not included”); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 7 1965).
45 Hooker v. Dep’t of Transp., 38 P.3d 1081, 1082–83 (Cal. 2002).
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[A] hirer of an independent contractor is not liable to an em-
ployee of the contractor merely because the hirer retained con-
trol over safety conditions at a worksite, but . . . a hirer is liable to
an employee of a contractor insofar as a hirer’s exercise of re-
tained control affirmatively contributed to the employee’s
injuries.46
Under California’s application of the retained control excep-
tion, it is not enough to have the right to control the work.47
The “hirer” of an independent contractor must also have actu-
ally exercised its control over the work in a way that contributed
to cause the independent contractor’s employee’s injuries.48
Some courts have declined to expand the application of the
retained control exception beyond the construction site con-
text.49 For instance, in Paquette v. Motor Auction Group, a Michi-
gan Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment and declined
to extend the retained control exception to a vehicle auction
house.50 The plaintiff was injured during an auto auction when
an independent contractor auctioneer closed a commercial ga-
rage door on him.51 The court declined to recognize a legal
duty owed by the auction house to supervise and train the inde-
pendent contractor auctioneer.52 The court further declined to
extend the retained control exception beyond the construction
industry context, holding that “[t]here is no support in the case
law for plaintiffs’ argument that the retained control doctrine
applies outside the context of construction sites, particularly
given its goal of ensuring safe working conditions.”53 Several
courts, however, have analyzed the retained control exception
in multiple-employer work environments outside of the con-
struction context.54
46 Id. at 1083.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Paquette v. Motor Auction Grp., No. 270979, 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 898, at
*9 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2007).
50 Id.
51 Id. at *3.
52 Id. at *4–5.
53 Id. at *9.
54 See, e.g., Adamson v. Port of Bellingham, No. C14-1804 MJP, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11774 (W.D. Wash. 2016); Easler v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d
251 (D. Mass. 2011); Harmon v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 2d 757 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
Oxford v. United States, 779 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Ariz. 1991); Appiah v. Hall, 962
A.2d 1046 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
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II. COURTS HAVE APPLIED THE CONCEPT OF
RETAINED CONTROL TO EVALUATE LIABILITY
OF AIRPORT OWNERS FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE INJURIES
Airport liability traditionally rests in theories of premises lia-
bility.55 Those traveling through or working at (but not for) air-
ports are business invitees to whom a duty of care is owed.56
Generally, however, an airport’s tort liability arises directly out
of a condition on the premises or by conduct of airport author-
ity employees.57 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 pro-
vides a mechanism for courts to expand airport liability to
employees of independent contractors under retained control
theories, even outside the construction context.58
In Harmon v. United States, the United States hired the plain-
tiff’s employer to provide aircraft fuel delivery at the Glenview
Naval Air Station.59 The plaintiff, an employee of a fueling con-
tractor, sued the airport owner, the United States, after he was
hit by a blast of air from a jet engine while preparing to refuel
an aircraft.60 The U.S. military set the procedures for aircraft
fueling while U.S. Navy personnel supervised.61 Navy personnel
were “responsible for signaling to the air crew to shut down the
jet engines” and then signaling to the fuel truck to enter the
area for fueling.62 The United States moved for summary judg-
ment on multiple grounds, including the independent contrac-
tor doctrine.63 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denied summary judgment, applying Restatement
§ 414 under Illinois state law: “the United States cannot dispute
that it had the requisite degree of control for this section to ap-
ply[ ] since the entire air station, and the refueling operations
in particular, were under the supervision of Navy personnel.”64
In another application of retained control concepts, an air-
port owner was protected by sovereign immunity upon a finding
55 See Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 296 P.3d 800, 804–05 (2013).
56 See id. at 805.
57 See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation §§ 101, 137 (2016).
58 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
59 Harmon, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
60 Id. at 759–60.
61 Id. at 759.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 760–61.
64 Id. at 763 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (AM. LAW INST.
1965)).
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of lack of control over the injury-causing instrumentality in City
of Houston v. Ranjel.65 Houston retained a third-party operator,
Johnson Controls, to operate the airport’s Automated People
Mover system (APM).66 Following expansion of the system but
while construction punch-list items remained open, two employ-
ees of subcontractors involved in the expansion project were se-
verely injured, one fatally, when they were struck by a newly
operational line.67 Plaintiffs alleged the City of Houston, as air-
port owner, was negligent for failing “to establish and/or com-
municate safety requirements regarding the APM system” and
failing “to implement adequate safeguards to prevent incidents
from occurring, such as the subject incident.”68
In reversing the trial court’s denial of Houston’s plea to juris-
diction based on governmental immunity, the court of appeals
held that because Houston did not operate or control the opera-
tion of the APM system, there was no waiver of governmental
immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.69 Although Houston
could permit reductions in the numbers of trains operated at a
particular time and shut down the system altogether via its main
electrical systems, the court found that Houson “had no ability
to directly affect the daily operation” of the system.70 Johnson
Controls had authority to enact and implement its own site poli-
cies and procedures without interference by the airport, though
the airport did provide a representative to “participate in the
formulation of policies related to accessing the APM
guideway.”71 Personnel of other entities requiring access to the
APM guideway required permission from both Houston and
Johnson Controls with the airport providing written guidelines
to such personnel before granting access.72 Johnson Controls
was responsible for ensuring personnel understood the guide-
lines and escorting personnel to the worksite.73 On the day of
the accident, no Houston employees were regularly working in
the Control Center and Houston “had no ability or contractual
65 407 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 884.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 883.
70 Id. at 885.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 886.
73 Id.
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authority to control directly the operation or use of the APM
trains.”74
The Texas Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction be-
tween an employee and independent contractor:
An independent contractor is one who, in pursuit of an indepen-
dent business, undertakes specific work for another using his
own means and methods without submitting to the control of the
other person as to the details of the work. Conversely, an em-
ployer controls not only the end sought to be accomplished, but
also the manner and means by which the end result is obtained.
In determining whether a person qualifies as an employee or is
instead an independent contractor, the focus is on who has the
right to control the details of the work. A “possibility” of control
is not evidence of a right to control.75
Under Texas law, right to control can be established via contrac-
tual provisions or, in the absence of express contractual provi-
sions, “actual control over the manner in which the work is
performed.”76
The Massachussetts Appeals Court affirmed summary judg-
ment for the airport owner in McNamara v. Massachusetts Port
Authority.77 The airport owner, Massachusetts Port Authority
(Massport), hired an independent contractor, Suburban, to pro-
vide bus service for employees between the airport and desig-
nated parking areas for employees.78 One of the bus’s steering
mechanisms malfunctioned, injuring the plaintiff, an employee
of the independent contractor bus service.79
The summary judgment materials established the following un-
disputed facts: (1) Suburban’s bus operation proposal to Mass-
port had provided that Suburban would be responsible for all
bus maintenance and repair; (2) the agreements between Mass-
port and Suburban stated that Suburban was to be an indepen-
dent contractor; (3) the agreements placed the obligations of
bus maintenance and repair on Suburban; (4) Suburban, not
Massport, selected and owned the employee buses; (5) McNa-
mara was employed by Suburban and not Massport; and (6) at no
time did Massport or any of its employees undertake to operate,
74 Id. at 886, 889–90.
75 Id. at 890 (citations omitted) (citing EPGT Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Harris Cty.
Flood Control Dist., 176 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
pet. dism’d).
76 Id.
77 573 N.E.2d 510 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
78 Id. at 511.
79 Id.
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maintain[,] or make repairs on any of the employee buses, or
supervise anyone at Suburban regarding such activities. Further-
more, nothing in the submitted materials revealed that Massport
knew or should have known of any problems or complaints con-
cerning the maintenance, repair[,] or mechanical condition of
any of the employee buses, including the bus driven by McNa-
mara, prior to her accident.
Massport was properly entitled on that record to judgment as a
matter of law.80
In affirming summary judgment, the appeals court held that the
plaintiff “failed to show that Massport owed her any duty giving
rise to tort liability.”81 Applying Section 414, the court explained
that McNamara’s potential liablity “depend[ed] on whether
Massport retained sufficient control over Suburban’s bus main-
tenance and repair work.”82 The appeals court found the follow-
ing contract provision insufficient to confer on Massport the
requisite control over Suburban’s maintenance and repair of its
buses:
Any vehicle and equipment of the service, which in the opinion
of [Massport] or its designee fails to meet the requirements
herein, shall immediately upon [Massport’s] direction, be re-
moved from the service and a substitute vehicle shall be immedi-
ately provided by [Massport]. The vehicle and/or equipment
removed shall not be returned to service until the condition
complained of and any other deficient condition has been
corrected.83
In another Massachussetts case, Peters v. Haymarket Leasing,
Inc.,84 the appeals court held that although Massport controlled
access to and movement of taxis at Logan International Airport,
in the absence of a contractual relationship between the author-
ity and the taxi operator, Section 414 did not apply.85
We assume for present purposes that the authority, desirous of
getting people into and out of the airport, realizes a benefit from
the availability of a class, i.e., taxi drivers, that conducts opera-
tions at that location. We acknowledge also that the authority ex-
ercises a modicum of control over those drivers by means of the
taxi pool procedure. These factors fall considerably short of cre-
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 511–12 (footnote omitted).
83 Id. at 512.
84 835 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
85 Id. at 638.
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ating a contractual relationship between Fenelus and the author-
ity. The authority did not deal with Fenelus or his representative;
the terms were mandated, not negotiated; and Fenelus was free
to provide the authority no service at all. We fail to see how there
was a mutuality of obligation where one of the “contracting” par-
ties was never required to do anything.86
The rationale in Peters suggests that airport operators should
mandate rules and regulations for operation on airport property
but avoid contractual relationships with business entities operat-
ing thereon. Peters raises the question of whether, had Massport
elected to issue licenses to taxi operators for the privilege of
picking up passengers at Logan, the result in that case would
have been different. Such a different result did occur across the
country in Washington state.87
III. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT
EXPANDED THE RETAINED CONTROL EXCEPTION
BEYOND THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
RELATIONSHIP TO HOLD AIRPORT OWNERS LIABLE
FOR INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES OF LICENSED VENDORS
In 2013, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the
reversal of summary judgment in favor of an airport owner ap-
plying the retained control exception to a licensed vendor rela-
tionship in Afoa v. Port of Seattle.88 The plaintiff sued the Port of
Seattle (the Port), the owner of Seattle-Tacoma International
Airport (Sea-Tac Airport), after losing control of his tug (alleg-
edly due to a mechanical failure) and crashing into a large piece
of equipment.89 The plaintiff was an employee of a vendor li-
censed by the airport to provide ground services to lessee air-
lines.90 The vendor, therefore, was not an independent
contractor of the Port. Rather, it was an independent contractor
ground service provider working for a number of airline lessees
of the Port.91 The Port moved for summary judgment, arguing
that it had merely licensed the vendor to work on the premises,
so it could not be held liable as an employer or as a “general
contractor” under the common law safe workplace doctrine,
86 Id.
87 Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 296 P.3d 800 (Wash. 2013).
88 Id. at 803.
89 Id. at 804.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 803–04.
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and it did not owe Washington Industrial and Safety Health Act
(WISHA) duties to vendors’ employees.92
The court disregarded as irrelevant the precise nature of the
relationship between the Port and plaintiff’s employer.93 In-
stead, the court analyzed the degree of control that the Port ex-
ercised over the area where the plaintiff was injured and the
equipment utilized to find issues of fact as to whether, based on
retained control, the Port owed plaintiff both a common law
duty of care and WISHA duties.94 The Port’s lease agreement
with the airlines granted the “airlines use of the Airfield Area
‘subject at all times to the exclusive control and management by
the Port.’”95 The license agreement “require[d the vendor] to
abide by all [of the] Port rules and regulations and allow[ ] the
Port to inspect [the vendor’s] work.”96 The Port conceded “at
oral argument . . . that the purpose of [these] rules and regula-
tions [was] to control the tarmac.”97 Finally, the plaintiff alleged
that the Port continuously controlled and supervised the ven-
dor’s employees, including tug brake maintenance following a
similar incident three months before the subject accident.98
“Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Afoa, a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that the Port had sufficiently perva-
sive control over [the vendor and employee] to create a duty to
maintain a safe workplace.”99
We recognize that many aspects of this case are unique; the Port
operates a highly complex, multi[-]employer work[ ]site and is
perhaps the only entity in a position to maintain worker safety.
Moreover, the Port has allegedly retained substantial control
over the manner in which work is done at Sea-Tac Airport. To
the extent other cases arise in the future, liability should depend
on similar factors. This narrow holding limits concerns raised by
amici that adhering to Kelley raises the specter of unintended lia-
bility for municipal corporations and other licensors.
But this holding also recognizes what is fair: that a jobsite owner
who exercises pervasive control over a work[ ]site should keep
that work[ ]site safe for all workers, just as a general contractor is
required to keep a construction site safe under Kelley, and just as
92 Id.
93 Id. at 809.
94 Id. at 806–12.
95 Id. at 804.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 812.
98 Id. at 808.
99 Id. at 812.
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a master is required to provide a safe workplace for its servants at
common law.100
The court further explained that if a jobsite owner retained suf-
ficient control over a multi-employer worksite to give rise to a
duty of care owed to another’s employees, then the jobsite
owner also would have a duty to comply with WISHA regulations
that “extend[ed] to all workers on the jobsite that may be
harmed by WISHA violations.”101 More specifically, the court en-
dorsed a “specific duty to prevent WISHA violations” by others
over whom the Port is found to retain control.102
The court acknowledged its decision was extending the com-
mon law related to “workplace safety law” but satisfied itself that
policies supporting worker safety justified the extension.103 “The
common law owes its glory to its ability to cope with new situa-
tions, and its principles are not mere printed fiats but living
tools to be used in solving emergent problems.”104 In identifying
the specific policy the court intended to advance, the court
explained:
If a jury accepts Afoa’s allegations [of retained control], the Port
controls the manner in which work is performed at Sea-Tac Air-
port, controls the instrumentalities of work, and controls work-
place safety. The Port is the only entity with sufficient supervisory
and coordinating authority to ensure safety in this complex,
multi[-]employer work[ ]site. If the Port does not keep Sea-Tac
Airport safe for workers, it is difficult to imagine who will.105
In finding a policy-based, common law duty extending to all
employees at a worksite, the court also relied upon the proposi-
tion that “very few jurisdictions take a contrary approach and
those that do have not considered the question in much de-
tail.”106 Specifically, the court identified the states of California,
Louisiana, and Vermont as states in which “the duty to provide a
safe workplace extends only to the worker’s ‘immediate em-
100 Id. (citing Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 582 P.2d 500 (Wash.
1978)).
101 Id. at 807.
102 Id. at 807–08.
103 Id. at 811.
104 Id. (citing Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 355 P.2d 781, 788 (Wash.
1960)).
105 Id. at 810.
106 Id. at 811.
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ployer or those who contract for the services of the immediate
employer.’”107
Although the Washington Supreme Court is correct in recog-
nizing that California restricts the scope of duties owed in com-
mon worksites, it is not accurate to suggest that California has
“not considered the question in much detail.”108 In Seabright v.
US Airways, the California Supreme Court held that “[b]y hiring
an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegates to the
contractor any tort law duty it owes to the contractor’s employees to
ensure the safety of the specific workplace that is the subject of
the contract.”109 US Airways, under a permit with the San Fran-
cisco International Airport, was responsible for the maintenance
of a baggage conveyor owned by the airport but operated by US
Airways.110 The conveyor lacked safeguards required by Califor-
nia Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal-OSHA) reg-
ulations.111 Plaintiff, the employee of US Airways’ maintenance
contractor, who was injured due to the lack of the required safe-
guards, asserted that US Airways’ breach of Cal-OSHA regula-
tions was a breach of a duty owed to him.112 The California
Supreme Court held:
When in this case defendant US Airways hired independent con-
tractor Aubry to maintain and repair the conveyor, US Airways
presumptively delegated to Aubry any tort law duty of care the
airline had under Cal-OSHA and its regulations to ensure work-
place safety for the benefit of Aubry’s employees. The delega-
tion—which . . . is implied as an incident of an independent
contractor’s hiring—included a duty to identify the absence of
the safety guards required by Cal-OSHA regulations and to take
reasonable steps to address that hazard.113
Whereas the Afoa court imposed upon the Port a duty to ensure
WISHA compliance by vendor-licensees to the extent it retained
control over airport operations,114 the Seabright court held that
US Airways presumptively delegated these duties to the indepen-
107 Id. at 812 n.4 (quoting Lopez v. Univ. Partners, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 359, 365
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
108 Id. at 811; see SeaBright Ins. Co. v. US Airways, Inc., 258 P.3d 737 (Cal.
2011).
109 SeaBright, 258 P.3d at 738.
110 Id. at 739.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 740.
113 Id. at 744.
114 Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 296 P.3d 800, 807 (Wash. 2013).
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dent contractor.115 While the Washington Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Port was in the best, if not exclusive, position to
ensure worker safety at the airport,116 California put more stake
in the validity of its worker’s compensation system: “workers’
compensation guarantees compensation for injured workers,
‘spreads the risk created by the performance of dangerous work
to those who . . . benefit from such work,’ and ‘encourages in-
dustrial safety.’”117
Also, in comparison to the Washington Supreme Court, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court declined to recognize an assumed
duty on the part of Massport by virtue of its control and imposi-
tion of a speed limit on the taxi holding area at Logan Interna-
tional Airport.118
We conclude that there was no separate duty, either imposed by
law or voluntarily assumed, by which the authority became an
insurer of the plaintiff against the negligent acts of others in the
taxi pool. That the authority posted speed limits as a means of
controlling operations within the taxi pool did not, on this re-
cord, constitute assumption of a legal duty to enforce the restric-
tions in the interest of the plaintiff.119
Judge Madsen’s dissent in Afoa would have reached a decision
aligned (though under slightly different analyses) with the Cali-
fornia and Massachussets courts.120 The dissent recognized the
distinction between an independent contractor relationship and
the precise relationship between the Port and vendors licensed
to work on the airport premises but not directly working for or
retained by the Port and explained: “[w]here there is no em-
ployment relationship between the defendant and an indepen-
dent contractor, the general rule does not apply and neither
does the retained[ ]control exception.”121
This policy underlying the no-liability rule [independent contrac-
tor doctrine] and its exception [retained control exception]
does not apply when there is no employer-independent contrac-
tor employment relationship. . . .
115 SeaBright, 258 P.3d at 741, 744.
116 Afoa, 296 P.3d at 810.
117 SeaBright, 258 P.3d at 745 (quoting Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721,
730 (Cal. 1993)).
118 Peters v. Haymarket Leasing, Inc., 835 N.E.2d 628, 630–32, 638–39 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005).
119 Id. at 637.
120 Afoa, 296 P.3d 800, 812–13 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
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[A] central premise [of WISHA obligations] is that the Port must
have been the equivalent of a direct employer and therefore sub-
ject to the same legal obligations that an employer has under
WISHA. None of our cases support the premise that WISHA lia-
bility exists otherwise. . . .
[I]t is the equivalency of the retained control in the independent
contractor setting to the control an employer exerts in the em-
ployer-employee relationship that justifies liability under the ex-
ception. A landlord, owner, or licensor does not have employer-
type duties resulting from the right to control unless the owner,
landlords, or licensor engaged the worker who is injured or en-
gaged an independent contractor and retained control over part
of the work performance, i.e., the manner of performing the
work and operative details of the work. A landlord, owner, or
licensor should not be subject to what is at the core an employer’s
liability under the retained control doctrine.122
The dissent further emphasized that, under the retained control
exception, what matters is “control over the manner in which
the work is performed” not “over the worksite, alone.”123
The dissent admonished that the expansion of WISHA obliga-
tions beyond the independent contractor, or retained control
relationship, described as “an onerous obligation,” should be
left to the legislature, not the courts.124 Consequently, the dis-
sent insists on application of the general principles within the
confines of an independent contractor relationship, a conclu-
sion that stands to prevail as the majority rule unless other states
follow the Afoa example.125
IV. IN HIGHLY REGULATED INDUSTRIES SUCH AS
AVIATION, AIRPORT OWNERS HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO
EXERCISE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER VENDORS
AND LESSEES—EXPOSING AIRPORT OWNERS TO TORT
LIABILITY FOR THE OPERATOR’S NEGLIGENCE
UNDER THE AFOA RATIONALE
What the majority in Afoa fails to account for is that federal
aviation regulations impose extensive regulations on airport
owners. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires
122 Id. at 813, 815.
123 Id. at 816.
124 Id. at 819–20.
125 Id. at 817–18. Note, however, that the dissent would entertain application
of the retained control exception in the case of airlines and their independent
contractor service providers. See id. at 817.
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that all airports limit access to runways, taxiways, and other areas
of the airport used for landing of aircraft.126 More importantly,
the FAA requires that airports establish, implement, and annu-
ally train all persons regarding movement and operation in these
areas.127 Thus, airport owners are legally obligated to implement
procedures for and annually train the employees of licensed
vendors and lessees operating on the airfield.
It is this federally regulated control that was central to the
court’s justification for imposing liability in Afoa.128 The court
relied on the fact that the airfield was subject at all times to the
control and management of the owner.129 The licensed vendor
was required to abide by the Port’s rules and regulations and the
owner supervised the vendor or lessee’s employees while they
were in the airfield area.130 All of these indicia of control reflect
the airport’s federal regulatory obligations, as the FAA requires
control and supervision of the airfield and workers operating on
it.131 Yet the Afoa court did not acknowledge that as compared to
an independent contractor-employment relationship, the Port
had no option but to impose such control. In other words, con-
trol was not a matter of contractual choice.132 The contractual
choice to delegate or not delegate responsibility for worksite
safety, a fundamental premise running through cases evaluating
the independent contractor doctrine, is wholly absent from the
relationship between a federally certificated Part 139 airport op-
erator and vendors permitted to work on the airfield.
The inescapable overlay of federally regulated control of the
airfield militates for a finding of less control, not more.
[T]o the extent that the government regulation of a particular
occupation is more extensive, the control by a putative employer
becomes less extensive because the employer cannot evade the
law either and in requiring compliance with the law he is not
126 14 C.F.R. §§ 139.329, 139.335 (2016); see E. Tazewell Ellett et al., FAA Regu-
lation of Airports, in AVIATION REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 297, 306 (David
Heffernan & Brent Connor eds., 2014); see also 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation §§ 14–16
(2016).
127 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 139.329, 139.303.
128 See Afoa, 296 P.3d at 808 (majority opinion).
129 Id. at 808.
130 Id. at 810, 812.
131 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 139.329, 139.303.
132 Afoa, 296 P.3d at 810, 812.
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controlling the [worker]. It is the law that controls the
[worker].133
This analysis, distinguishing between control imposed by reg-
ulation as opposed to control imposed by contract or employ-
ment status, often is discussed in the context of classifying an
individual as either an employee or independent contractor in
National Labor Relations Board cases. In that context, courts
require pervasive control beyond government regulations to
find the individual was an employee.134
It is especially crucial for courts to analyze the nature of feder-
ally mandated control in the context of the independent con-
tractor doctrine because far less control is required to find
liability under the retained control exception than is required to
establish an employment relationship.135 If the control man-
dated by federal regulations is sufficient to meet this lower stan-
dard, as the Afoa court concluded, airport owners may face
boundless tort liability, unrestrained by the workers’ compensa-
tion system.
V. THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF PROTECTION-BY-
INDEMNIFICATION DESTROYS WORKERS’
COMPENSATION IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION
ULTIMATELY MAY BE REQUIRED TO AVOID IMPOSING
LIABILITY ON AIRPORT OWNERS FOR THE NEGLIGENCE
OF VENDORS AND LESSEES
The risk of exposure to airport owners and operators is miti-
gated through broadly written indemnity provisions in vendor
license agreements and airport leases. The result of these in-
demnity provisions, however, is that workers’ compensation im-
munity, effectively, is destroyed. The legally immune employer
and its liability policy respond to the employee’s tort claim, thus
reducing (if not eliminating) the intended industry cost-savings
of the workers’ compensation system. This result was neither in-
tended by the workers’ compensation system nor, apparently,
anticipated by the gradual but persistent erosion of the indepen-
dent contractor doctrine. Yet it is so pervasive a practice as to
have become the norm.
133 Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. [NLRB], 603
F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
134 See, e.g., Air Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 1095, 1100 (4th Cir. 1982);
SIDA of Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1975).
135 See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors §§ 8, 27.
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The prevalence of contractual indemnity agreements rein-
forces the impact of permitting recovery against the entity that
hired the injured worker’s employer as an independent contrac-
tor. To satisfy its contractual indemnity and insurance obliga-
tions, the independent contractor “must provide two kinds of
coverage to accommodate the same risk,”136 thereby ameliorat-
ing the reduction in insurance costs anticipated by workers’
compensation immunity. The Fourth District Court of Appeal of
California highlighted this very problem in the context of an
independent contractor relationship:
In conjunction with Privette’s point about societal interest, to
make the person who hires an independent contractor liable for
the workplace injuries of the latter’s employees merely because
of an indemnification agreement is to make both the hirer and
the independent contractor pay for the same risk twice in the form
of insurance premiums [that] must provide two kinds of cover-
age to accommodate the same risk. That is, the person who hires
an independent contractor must not only pay a price [that] cov-
ers the independent contractor’s workers’ compensation insurance
costs, but must also have to pay a cost [that] covers the indepen-
dent contractor’s liability insurance costs for the contractual lia-
bility the independent contractor will have assumed for the tort
liability of the general contractor . . . . A corollary of the same-
risk-twice point is that varying a result otherwise dictated by the
Privette decision because of the existence of express indemnifica-
tion would denude subcontractors of the protection of the exclu-
sive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation laws.
General contractors require express indemnification clauses in
almost all subcontracts in the construction industry. If general
contractors were liable to subcontractors’ employees for injuries
caused by subcontractor negligence, subcontractors would have
to pay twice for workplace injuries—once in workers’ compensa-
tion premiums, and once in liability insurance premiums.137
In the absence of either legislation or further development of
common law protections to land owners, airport owners must
continue to ensure that the indemnification provisions in their
lease agreements and vendor licenses are enforceable and pro-
tected by sufficient levels of insurance coverage. In many states,
an indemnification provision is not enforceable against an em-
ployer for claims arising out of an employee’s injuries unless the
136 Redfeather v. Chevron USA, Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 161 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (footnote omitted).
137 Id.
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employer specifically and expressly waives its immunity under
the state’s workers’ compensation statute.138 Such indemnifica-
tion provisions, if enforceable under state law, generally are
meaningful only to the extent sufficient liability coverage is re-
quired by contract. The insurance provisions should not only
require coverage for the indemnification obligation, but also re-
quire the lessee or vendor to name the airport as an additional
insured on its liability policy, conferring the rights of an insured
on the airport owner.
If the rationale of the Washington Supreme Court in Afoa
takes hold in other states and the prevailing practice of protec-
tion-through-indemnification becomes unwieldly or too expen-
sive, federal legislation may be required. Federal legislation
could reinstate the predictability and certainty of workers’ com-
pensation systems, while still holding Part 139 airport owners
and operators responsible for the safety of their own employees
and business invitees. If, merely by following federal regulations
requiring extensive control of air fields, airport owners are sub-
ject to independent liability to a vendor or lessee’s employee
under the retained control exception, liability insurance premi-
ums for indemnifying vendors and lessees, not to mention the
airports, undoubtedly will increase. Federal legislation could
preempt the application of judicially created doctrines such as
“retained control,” reducing the possibility that exercising con-
trol required by FAA regulations will subject the airport owner
to separate and additional liability to vendor and lessee employ-
ees. Any such legislation would not immunize airport owners
from liability for their own employees’ negligence or under the-
ories of premises liability. It would, however, inoculate airport
owners from liability for the failings of licensed vendor and
lessee operators on the airfield.
138 See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. J.M. Tull Metals Co., 629 So. 2d
633, 638 (Ala. 1993); Snare v. Ebensburg Power Co., 637 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993); Gilbert H. Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 912 P.2d 472,
476–77 (Wash. 1996).
